想要創(chuàng)新？就成為“現(xiàn)在學(xué)家”

　　導(dǎo)語：要想創(chuàng)新，我們應(yīng)該關(guān)心的是現(xiàn)在，而不是未來。

　　On March 10, 2011, I was in Cambridge at the MIT Media Lab meeting with faculty, students and staff, and we were trying to figure out whether I should be the next director.

　　2011年3月11日 我在劍橋的MIT 媒體實驗室 跟教師，學(xué)生和工作人員一起開會， 我們都想弄清楚 我是否可以成為下一個系主任。

　　That night, at midnight, a magnitude 9 earthquake hit off of the Pacific coast of Japan. My wife and family were in Japan, and as the news started to come in, I was panicking. I was looking at the news streams and listening to the press conferences of the government officials and the Tokyo Power Company, and hearing about this explosion at the nuclear reactors and this cloud of fallout that was headed towards our house which was only about 200 kilometers away. And the people on TV weren't telling us anything that we wanted to hear. I wanted to know what was going on with the reactor, what was going on with the radiation, whether my family was in danger.

　　那天晚上，在深夜， 巨大的九級地震 襲擊了日本的太平洋海岸 我的孩子和妻子都在日本， 當(dāng)消息來到的時候， 我很恐慌。 我看著新聞 聽著 官方的新聞發(fā)布會 以及東京電力公司的消息， 聽到 核反應(yīng)器的爆炸 還有這片核反應(yīng)云在飄向 我們家的方向 只有大約200 千米以外。 而電視的報道人員不會告訴我們?nèi)魏?我們想知道的事情。 我想知道核反應(yīng)器究竟出了什么故障， 放射線到底是怎么回事， 我的家人是否有危險。

　　So I did what instinctively felt like the right thing, which was to go onto the Internet and try to figure out if I could take matters into my own hands. On the Net, I found there were a lot of other people like me trying to figure out what was going on, and together we sort of loosely formed a group and we called it Safecast, and we decided we were going to try to measure the radiation and get the data out to everybody else, because it was clear that the government wasn't going to be doing this for us.

　　我直覺地感到該做得事情是 到互聯(lián)網(wǎng) 并且試圖弄清楚 我自己是否可以解決這個問題。 在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)上，我發(fā)現(xiàn)有很多人 像我一樣想弄清楚到底發(fā)生了什么。 于是我們就這么夠成了一個松散的組織， 我們把它叫做平安廣播， 我們決定要嘗試 測量輻射強度 并且把每個人的數(shù)據(jù)收集起來， 因為明顯政府 不會為我們做這些事。

　　Three years later, we have 16 million data points, we have designed our own Geiger counters that you can download the designs and plug it into the network. We have an app that shows you most of the radiation in Japan and other parts of the world. We are arguably one of the most successful citizen science projects in the world, and we have created the largest open dataset of radiation measurements.

　　三年后， 我們有了160 萬個數(shù)據(jù)點， 我們設(shè)計了自己的蓋格計數(shù)器(放射線探測儀)， 你可以下載設(shè)置， 并且把它和聯(lián)網(wǎng)系統(tǒng)連接起來。 我們有一個軟件讓你看到 日本和大部分世界其他地區(qū)的輻射強度。 我們可以說是在世界上最成功的一個 公民科學(xué)項目。 并且我們創(chuàng)建了 最大的開放性核輻射測量數(shù)據(jù)集。

　　And the interesting thing here is how did — (Applause) — Thank you. How did a bunch of amateurs who really didn't know what we were doing somehow come together and do what NGOs and the government were completely incapable of doing? And I would suggest that this has something to do with the Internet. It's not a fluke. It wasn't luck, and it wasn't because it was us. It helped that it was an event that pulled everybody together, but it was a new way of doing things that was enabled by the Internet and a lot of the other things that were going on, and I want to talk a little bit about what those new principles are.

　　并且，這里有趣的是， 究竟是如何 —(鼓掌)— 感謝 一群毫無頭緒的 非專業(yè)人員 就這么聚在一起， 做到了NGOs和政府 完全做不到的事情? 我想說這是因為 有了互聯(lián)網(wǎng)。這不是僥幸， 也不是幸運，也不是因為我們這些人， 而是因為這個事件 使大家聚集在了一起。 但這是一個新的做事的方法， 是由互聯(lián)網(wǎng) 和一些其它的我們在做的事情促成的。 所以我就想談?wù)勥@些 新的概念。

　　So remember before the Internet? (Laughter) I call this B.I. Okay? So, in B.I., life was simple. Things were Euclidian, Newtonian, somewhat predictable. People actually tried to predict the future, even the economists. And then the Internet happened, and the world became extremely complex, extremely low-cost, extremely fast, and those Newtonian laws that we so dearly cherished turned out to be just local ordinances, and what we found was that in this completely unpredictable world that most of the people who were surviving were working with sort of a different set of principles, and I want to talk a little bit about that.

　　2:38 記得在有互聯(lián)網(wǎng)之前嗎?(笑聲) 我把這叫做B.I.行嗎? 那么，在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)之前，生活是簡單的。 像歐幾里德，牛頓學(xué)說， 這些事在某種程度上來說是可以預(yù)料的。 事實上人們在試圖預(yù)測未來， 甚至是經(jīng)濟學(xué)家。 然后因特網(wǎng)出現(xiàn)了， 然后世界就變得特別復(fù)雜， 特別的便宜，并特別的快， 那些我們一度如此珍愛的 牛頓定律 原來只是局部的規(guī)則， 我們發(fā)現(xiàn)在這個 完全無法預(yù)測的世界， 大部分生存下來的人 都在用不同的原理工作， 所以我也要想談那個方面。

　　Before the Internet, if you remember, when we tried to create services, what you would do is you'd create the hardware layer and the network layer and the software and it would cost millions of dollars to do anything that was substantial. So when it costs millions of dollars to do something substantial, what you would do is you'd get an MBA who would write a plan and get the money from V.C.s or big companies, and then you'd hire the designers and the engineers, and they'd build the thing. This is the Before Internet, B.I., innovation model. What happened after the Internet was the cost of innovation went down so much because the cost of collaboration, the cost of distribution, the cost of communication, and Moore's Law made it so that the cost of trying a new thing became nearly zero, and so you would have Google, Facebook, Yahoo, students that didn't have permission — permissionless innovation — didn't have permission, didn't have PowerPoints, they just built the thing, then they raised the money, and then they sort of figured out a business plan and maybe later on they hired some MBAs. So the Internet caused innovation, at least in software and services, to go from an MBA-driven innovation model to a designer-engineer-driven innovation model, and it pushed innovation to the edges, to the dorm rooms, to the startups, away from the large institutions, the stodgy old institutions that had the power and the money and the authority. And we all know this. We all know this happened on the Internet. It turns out it's happening in other things, too. Let me give you some examples.

　　如果你還記得，在有英特網(wǎng)之前， 當(dāng)我們嘗試去創(chuàng)建一個服務(wù)項目， 你所要做的是你首先得創(chuàng)建 一個硬件層面然后是網(wǎng)絡(luò)層面和軟件， 這需要花費上百萬美元 才能做到最基本的事情。 那么當(dāng)需要花費上百萬美元做那些基礎(chǔ)的事情的時候， 你得有一名MBA， 他會寫一個計劃書， 然后從風(fēng)投或者一個大公司 獲得資助。 然后你還要雇傭設(shè)計師和工程師， 然后他們按照你的構(gòu)想實現(xiàn)它。 這是在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)出現(xiàn)之前，B.I, 的創(chuàng)新模式。 在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)出現(xiàn)之后發(fā)生的是 創(chuàng)新所需的花費大幅度下降了， 因為合作的開銷，推廣的開銷 交流的開銷，和摩爾定律， 讓嘗試一樣新東西的花費 低至接近于零， 你有谷歌，臉書，雅虎， 沒有許可證的學(xué)生—— 不需要許可證來發(fā)明創(chuàng)新—— 沒有許可證，沒有幻燈片， 他們只是制作產(chǎn)品， 然后他們籌集資金， 再大略弄出一個銷售計劃， 也許后來他們雇了商管博士。 所以互聯(lián)網(wǎng)引起了革新， 至少在軟件和服務(wù)上， 從商管博士驅(qū)動的創(chuàng)新模式， 到設(shè)計師-工程師驅(qū)動的創(chuàng)建模式， 它把創(chuàng)新推進到了邊緣， 到了宿舍，到了新企業(yè)， 遠離了大型的研究機構(gòu)， 遠離了強力，有錢和有權(quán)威 卻老而蠢笨的研究所。 我們都知道這一點。我們都知道這是在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)上發(fā)生的。 實際上在其他事情上也是如此。 讓我給你們看一個例證。

　　So at the Media Lab, we don't just do hardware. We do all kinds of things. We do biology, we do hardware, and Nicholas Negroponte famously said, "Demo or die," as opposed to "Publish or perish," which was the traditional academic way of thinking. And he often said, the demo only has to work once, because the primary mode of us impacting the world was through large companies being inspired by us and creating products like the Kindle or Lego Mindstorms. But today, with the ability to deploy things into the real world at such low cost, I'm changing the motto now, and this is the official public statement. I'm officially saying, "Deploy or die." You have to get the stuff into the real world for it to really count, and sometimes it will be large companies, and Nicholas can talk about satellites. (Applause) Thank you. But we should be getting out there ourselves and not depending on large institutions to do it for us.

　　在媒體實驗室，我們不只是做硬件。 我們做各種各樣的事情。 我們做生物學(xué)，我們也做硬件。 尼克拉思.尼格羅龐特的名言是“或為演示，或是死亡” 反過來就是“發(fā)表或者腐爛，” 那是典型的傳統(tǒng)學(xué)術(shù)想法 他常說，演示只需成功一次， 因為我們原始的模式 是通過汲取了我們 靈感的大公司從而影響了世界， 并且創(chuàng)造了像電子閱讀器或者樂高頭腦風(fēng)暴等。 但今天，在一個有能力做到用如此低廉的費用 讓構(gòu)想在現(xiàn)實中實現(xiàn)的世界， 我現(xiàn)在正在改變這個箴言， 這是官方的公開的聲明。 我正式宣告，”不上線，不如死“。 你得把東西弄進現(xiàn)實中， 因為這樣才算數(shù)， 有時候是大公司， 和尼古拉思才能談?wù)撔l(wèi)星。 (鼓掌) 感謝你們。 但是我們應(yīng)該讓自己走出來， 不再依賴大公司為我們做事。

　　So last year, we sent a bunch of students to Shenzhen, and they sat on the factory floors with the innovators in Shenzhen, and it was amazing. What was happening there was you would have these manufacturing devices, and they weren't making prototypes or PowerPoints. They were fiddling with the manufacturing equipment and innovating right on the manufacturing equipment. The factory was in the designer, and the designer was literally in the factory. And so what you would do is, you'd go down to the stalls and you would see these cell phones. So instead of starting little websites like the kids in Palo Alto do, the kids in Shenzhen make new cell phones. They make new cell phones like kids in Palo Alto make websites, and so there's a rainforest of innovation going on in the cell phone. What they do is, they make a cell phone, go down to the stall, they sell some, they look at the other kids' stuff, go up, make a couple thousand more, go down. Doesn't this sound like a software thing? It sounds like agile software development, A/B testing and iteration, and what we thought you could only do with software kids in Shenzhen are doing this in hardware. My next fellow, I hope, is going to be one of these innovators from Shenzhen.

　　于是，去年，我們送了一些學(xué)生到深圳， 他們坐在工廠的地板上 跟深圳的革新人員在一塊兒，確實很令人驚異。 在那里發(fā)生的是 你有這些出自出產(chǎn)的設(shè)備， 他們并不做原型或者幻燈片演講。 他們擺弄著出產(chǎn)設(shè)備， 直接在設(shè)備上進行革新。 工廠就在設(shè)計之中， 而設(shè)計師真的在工廠里。 那么你所要做的是， 你下樓到貨攤上， 然后你會看到這些手機。 而不是 像開帕羅.阿爾托的孩子們那樣開啟一個小小的網(wǎng)站 深圳的孩子做新手機。 他們像在帕羅.阿爾托的孩子做 網(wǎng)頁一樣做新手機， 所以，在手機行業(yè) 有一種革新的熱潮。 他們所做的就是制造手機， 然后下樓到貨攤上去賣， 他們也看其它的孩子用品，然后上樓， 又多做幾千個，然后再下樓去賣。 這聽起來像是軟件之類的事情嗎? 這聽起來像靈活的軟件開發(fā)， A/B測試和重復(fù)， 我們認為只能在軟件層面完成的事情， 深圳的孩子是在這種硬件上完成的。 我的下一個工作人員，我希望是 這些來自深圳的革新者之一。

　　And so what you see is that is pushing innovation to the edges. We talk about 3D printers and stuff like that, and that's great, but this is Limor. She is one of our favorite graduates, and she is standing in front of a Samsung Techwin Pick and Place Machine. This thing can put 23,000 components per hour onto an electronics board. This is a factory in a box. So what used to take a factory full of workers working by hand in this little box in New York, she's able to have effectively — She doesn't actually have to go to Shenzhen to do this manufacturing. She can buy this box and she can manufacture it. So manufacturing, the cost of innovation, the cost of prototyping, distribution, manufacturing, hardware, is getting so low that innovation is being pushed to the edges and students and startups are being able to build it. This is a recent thing, but this will happen and this will change just like it did with software.

　　那么你明白了 是什么把革新推到了邊緣。 我們談?wù)?D打印機之類的東西， 那是極好的，但這是利莫爾。 她是我們最喜歡的一個畢業(yè)生之一， 她站在三星 泰克電子板揀選機和置放機的前沿, 這東西能在每小時把23000個元件 放到電子板上。 這是一個盒子里的工廠。 我們過去所用的滿是工人 用手工作業(yè)的工廠， 都在這個小盒子里，在紐約， 她能夠很有效地- 她不用去深圳 就可以做這樣產(chǎn)品。 她能買下這個盒子然后就可以做出產(chǎn)品。 那么生產(chǎn)，革新的成本， 樣本制作的成本，配銷，出產(chǎn)，硬件， 都越來越低廉， 以致于革新被推倒了邊緣。 所以學(xué)生和新企業(yè)都能夠建造。 這是最近的事，但這將會發(fā)生， 并且改變， 就像我們在軟件上的變革。

　　Sorona is a DuPont process that uses a genetically engineered microbe to turn corn sugar into polyester. It's 30 percent more efficient than the fossil fuel method, and it's much better for the environment. Genetic engineering and bioengineering are creating a whole bunch of great new opportunities for chemistry, for computation, for memory. We will probably be doing a lot, obviously doing health things, but we will probably be growing chairs and buildings soon. The problem is, Sorona costs about 400 million dollars and took seven years to build. It kind of reminds you of the old mainframe days. The thing is, the cost of innovation in bioengineering is also going down. This is desktop gene sequencer. It used to cost millions and millions of dollars to sequence genes. Now you can do it on a desktop like this, and kids can do this in dorm rooms. This is Gen9 gene assembler, and so right now when you try to print a gene, what you do is somebody in a factory with pipettes puts the thing together by hand, you have one error per 100 base pairs, and it takes a long time and costs a lot of money. This new device assembles genes on a chip, and instead of one error per 100 base pairs, it's one error per 10,000 base pairs. In this lab, we will have the world's capacity of gene printing within a year, 200 million base pairs a year. This is kind of like when we went from transistor radios wrapped by hand to the Pentium. This is going to become the Pentium of bioengineering, pushing bioengineering into the hands of dorm rooms and startup companies.

　　梭羅那是杜邦公司的處理器， 它利用一個遺傳工程微生物 把玉米的糖轉(zhuǎn)分化成聚酯纖維。 它比化石燃油法多了百分之三十的效率， 對環(huán)境好得多。 基因工程和生物工程 正在創(chuàng)造很多 極其嶄新的機會， 為化學(xué)，為計算，為記憶。 我們可能會做很多，顯然是利于健康的事情， 而且在不久的將來我們可能會種植出椅子， 或是建筑。 目前的問題是，梭羅那花費約 4億美元， 需要七年來建成。 這某種程度上讓你回憶起老主機的日子。 事實是，在生物工程學(xué)上革新的成本 也降低了。 這是臺型基因測序儀。 過去要花費幾百萬的成本來測基因序列。 而現(xiàn)在，你能在像這樣的桌面儀器上做， 學(xué)生們可以在宿舍里做。 這是簡9基因組合儀， 那么現(xiàn)在當(dāng)你想要打印一個基因， 你要做的就是讓工廠里的某個人 用手上的加樣器吧東西加在一起， 每一百個基因組合就會有一個錯誤， 并且花很長時間和很多錢。 這個新的設(shè)備 在一個芯片上把基因組合一起 比起每一百個堿基就有一個誤讀， 他能做到一萬個堿基才有一個誤讀。 在這個實驗室，我們有世界級的容量 在一年之內(nèi)打印出基因， 是2億個堿基一年。 這有些像我們從 用手動包裝晶體管 到奔騰處理器。 這將是生物工程領(lǐng)域的飛躍， 把生物工程推到 宿舍和新企業(yè)的手邊。

　　So it's happening in software and in hardware and bioengineering, and so this is a fundamental new way of thinking about innovation. It's a bottom-up innovation, it's democratic, it's chaotic, it's hard to control. It's not bad, but it's very different, and I think that the traditional rules that we have for institutions don't work anymore, and most of us here operate with a different set of principles. One of my favorite principles is the power of pull, which is the idea of pulling resources from the network as you need them rather than stocking them in the center and controlling everything.

　　所以這正發(fā)生在軟件，硬件 以及生物工程領(lǐng)域， 所以這對創(chuàng)新來說是一個全新的思維方式。 這是一個由下至上的變革，是全民性的， 也是混亂，難以控制的。 這并不是不好，只是相對以往來說很不同， 我認為我們所沿用的研究機構(gòu)的傳統(tǒng)的規(guī)則 已經(jīng)不再合適了， 我們這兒的大多數(shù)人 都本著不同的`原則在運作。 而我最喜歡的一個原理是拉力， 是收取資源的理念。 當(dāng)需要的時候從互聯(lián)網(wǎng)上拿取， 而不是把它們存儲在一個地方 從而試圖控制每一件事。

　　So in the case of the Safecast story, I didn't know anything when the earthquake happened, but I was able to find Sean who was the hackerspace community organizer, and Peter, the analog hardware hacker who made our first Geiger counter, and Dan, who built the Three Mile Island monitoring system after the Three Mile Island meltdown. And these people I wouldn't have been able to find beforehand and probably were better that I found them just in time from the network.

　　那么在這個“安全廣播”的案例里， 在地震發(fā)生的時候我不知道任何事情， 但是我能找到塞恩， 他是黑客空間組織會的組織者， 而彼得，類似硬件黑客， 他制作了我們第一個放射線探測儀， 而丹，是三哩島的核泄漏事故監(jiān)測系統(tǒng)的建造者， 這是在三哩島融化以后的事。 那些我之前不可能會找到的人， 我在最需要的時候在網(wǎng)上找到了他們， 這時間點更好了。

　　I'm a three-time college dropout, so learning over education is very near and dear to my heart, but to me, education is what people do to you and learning is what you do to yourself.

　　我三次從大學(xué)退學(xué)， 所以依靠傳統(tǒng)教育來學(xué)習(xí) 對我來說是近而遠之的事情， 但對我來說，教育是別人給你的， 但學(xué)習(xí)是你自己所成的。

　　And it feels like, and I'm biased, it feels like they're trying to make you memorize the whole encyclopedia before they let you go out and play, and to me, I've got Wikipedia on my cell phone, and it feels like they assume you're going to be on top of some mountain all by yourself with a number 2 pencil trying to figure out what to do when in fact you're always going to be connected, you're always going to have friends, and you can pull Wikipedia up whenever you need it, and what you need to learn is how to learn. In the case of Safecast, a bunch of amateurs when we started three years ago, I would argue that we probably as a group know more than any other organization about how to collect data and publish data and do citizen science.

　　這感覺好像，我可能有些偏見， 感覺好像他們想要在你出去玩兒之前 讓記住全部的百科全書， 對我來說，我在手機上安裝了維基百科， 感覺他們好像在假設(shè)， 你將要帶著一只2號鉛筆，全憑你自己 達到某個山的頂峰， 努力弄清楚該做什么。 但事實上，你永遠是和外界有聯(lián)系的， 你永遠有朋友， 而當(dāng)你需要時，你隨時可以借用維基百科， 你要學(xué)的是怎樣學(xué)習(xí)。 在平安廣播的例子里，一群業(yè)余人事 在三年前我們剛起步的時候， 我認為作為一個小組 我們可能比任何其它的研究機構(gòu)知道更多 有關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)搜集和發(fā)布的知識。 并且做公民的科學(xué)研究。

　　Compass over maps. So this one, the idea is that the cost of writing a plan or mapping something is getting so expensive and it's not very accurate or useful. So in the Safecast story, we knew we needed to collect data, we knew we wanted to publish the data, and instead of trying to come up with the exact plan, we first said, oh, let's get Geiger counters. Oh, they've run out. Let's build them. There aren't enough sensors. Okay, then we can make a mobile Geiger counter. We can drive around. We can get volunteers. We don't have enough money. Let's Kickstarter it. We could not have planned this whole thing, but by having a very strong compass, we eventually got to where we were going, and to me it's very similar to agile software development, but this idea of compasses is very important.

　　用指南針代替地圖。 那么這一個理念是，寫計劃書 或者策劃的花費什么變得如此昂貴 卻它不是很精確或?qū)嵱谩?所以在平安廣播的故事里，我們知道我們需要搜集數(shù)據(jù)， 我們知道我們想發(fā)表數(shù)據(jù)， 與其做出一個詳細的計劃， 我們先說，啊，需要一個放射線探測儀。 哦，我們沒有。 那我們就做一個。沒有足夠的感知器。 行，我們就做一個移動的探測儀， 我們開車四處轉(zhuǎn)悠，我們尋找志愿者。 我們沒有錢，就亂糟糟地開始吧。 我們不能把所有的事情都計劃好， 但我們有著一個很堅定的指南， 我們最終達到了我們的目的地， 對我來說，這和靈活的軟件的開發(fā)相似， 但這個”指南針“理論很重要。

　　So I think the good news is that even though the world is extremely complex, what you need to do is very simple. I think it's about stopping this notion that you need to plan everything, you need to stock everything, and you need to be so prepared, and focus on being connected, always learning, fully aware, and super present.

　　于是我認為好消息是， 即使世界是那么的復(fù)雜， 而你所要做的卻很簡單。 我認為該停止這種概念， 每一件事都需要事先計劃好， 你需要儲備所有東西， 你需要做好充足的準(zhǔn)備， 并把精力放在建立聯(lián)系上面， 總是學(xué)習(xí)， 充分地自知， 關(guān)注當(dāng)下。

　　So I don't like the word "futurist." I think we should be now-ists, like we are right now.

　　那么我們不喜歡“未來主義者”這個詞， 我認為我們應(yīng)該是現(xiàn)在學(xué)家，就像現(xiàn)在。

　　Thank you.

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